The twelfth Bilderberg Meeting was held on 29, 30 and 31 March 1963 at the Hotel Martinez, Cannes (France) under the chairmanship of H.R.H. the Prince of the Netherlands. Participants numbered ninety and represented the United States, Canada and fifteen European countries together with various international organizations.
They were drawn from among political leaders (members of governments and parliamentarians) and leading figures in business, journalism, the civil service (national and international), the liberal professions and trade-union organizations.
Three items were included on the Agenda:
I – The balance of power in the light of recent international developments.
II – Trade relations between the U.S.A. and Europe in the light of the negotiations for Britain’s entry into the Common Market.
III – Trade relations between the Western world and the developing countries (tariffs, quotas, commodity arrangements, etc.). Ad. I This item will cover changes in power relations—political, economic and military— between the Communist and Western countries and inside each group.
A written note had previously been drawn up by an Italian participant who referred to its main lines of argument in addressing the meeting. The failure of the Russian bluff over Cuba, wrote this participant, demonstrated:
a) that there is a balance; at an extremely high level of destruction, between the military potential of the United States and the USSR;
b) that Khrushchev recognises this fact and that, whatever he may say in public, he is prepared to accept the consequences of this balance. There was therefore reason to hope that “peaceful co-existence”, without open hostility, would continue for some time.
The author went on to discuss the circumstances surrounding the recent breakdown of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the E.E.C. and expressed his bitter regret concerning them.
The main elements brought out in the course of the discussion may be listed as follows although the same discussion revealed that they were closely interconnected :
-the failure of the Brussels negotiations,
-the doubts sometimes expressed in Europe as to the United States’ determination to use their nuclear deterrent in support of their allies in the event of war;
-the lack of balance between United States’ nuclear power and the forces of its European partners and, as a result, the problems arising from American leadership;
-the French determination to create an independent nuclear force and the resulting apprehension that “dissemination” and even “proliferation” of nuclear weapons might take place;
-the divergences between the allies as to the formulas whereby the NATO Treaty might be improved, if necessary, more especially as regards the supreme control of nuclear weapons.
While all the European speakers discussing the failure of the Brussels negotiations recognised its harmful consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, there were some who showed themselves anxious to reduce the question to narrower proportions.
A French speaker, for instance, considered that two problems had been confused:
-a political problem in that the original purpose in creating “the Europe of the Six” had been to enable Germany to recover its place in the concert of nations without at the same time recovering all the elements of national sovereignty so that transfer of these to a higher community became necessary. At the time, this policy had been opposed both by the British as a whole and by General de Gaulle’s supporters;
– an economic problem arising at the Atlantic level and which should not therefore be presented in terms of Great Britain’s adherence to the Common Market. There was, in this speaker’s view, no contradiction between a politically integrated Europe—even limited to six members—and an Atlantic world co-operating closely in the military and economic fields.
A British participant, supported by various other speakers, considered the Brussels breakdown to be the result of a combination of factors rather than of the French Government’s attitude alone and that the responsibility should not be attributed exclusively to the President of the Republic.
With the support of other speakers in the subsequent discussions, he argued that it was above all essential to avoid any policy calculated to hinder Great Britain’s association with Europe when the time came.
A number of American participants considered the contention that their determination to intervene on behalf of their allies was any less than in the past to be utterly without foundation.
In particular, they stressed the extent of American forces in Europe and the importance of their country’s financial contribution to joint defence. Nearly 400.000 American troops were stationed in Europe, some of them accompanied by their families, and this demonstrated the permanent nature of their commitment, although the North Atlantic Treaty had been “sold” to the American public without any implication that American ground forces would be stationed in Europe under it.
In this respect, actions had outstripped commitments, just as the United States had already intervened in two world wars without having previously committed itself to do so. The American attitude had always been governed by long-term considerations without regard to the circumstances of the moment.
Similarly, on the financial level, military expenditure had continued to be extremely heavy; at the present time, 60 cents out of every dollar of public funds went to defence. Must the United States go bankrupt, asked one speaker, in order to convince its European friends? Many U.S. congressmen would be only too happy to see Europe take over the defence of Europe, if only to save the three billion dollars which it cost to maintain American troops on the Continent.
A Belgian speaker, regarded the French decision to acquire an independent nuclear force as the real cause behind the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations (because of the position adopted by Great Britain in the Bahamas) and expressed vigorous opposition to that decision.
A British participant argued that the question was not whether France would have a nuclear force or not but what that country would do with it.
A French participant observed that France wished its European allies to play the very role which France herself refused to play vis-a-vis the United States. He considered, however, that Britain, on its side, should become more “European”.
The European countries’ great desire to be associated with nuclear strategy (a desire which was met by the American proposal for a NATO force) and their anxiety to avoid being excluded from research concerning atomic energy and delivery systems were entirely legitimate but the methods of satisfying such aspirations should be discussed within the framework of NATO and it was reasonable to fear that no such discussion would take place until agreement was reached on the key principle of the indivisibility of free world defence. And it was France’s voice above all which was awaited in vain in the international institutions.
Finantics 